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The question of ‘nature’ is of particular
importance for feminist theorizing as
feminists have long come to realise that it is
often upon this ‘concept’ that the giveness of
sexual differences and, consequently, the
inferiority of ‘women’, is assumed1. It is
against biological determinism that feminists
have developed their most powerful theories
and critiques of dominant categorisations of
‘women’ (see, for example, de Beauvoir,
19892 ; Rich, 1981). Particularly, both ‘second
wave feminists’ generally, and eco-feminists
specifically, tended to criticise dominant
conceptualisations of women as ‘naturally’
inferior and assert the political importance of
reclaiming ‘nature’, ‘the natural’ and ‘the
feminine’ from the grip of exploitative
scientific patriarchalism (in Kemp and Squires,
1997: 469). However, whereas the question
of nature remains extremely important to
today’s feminists, post-structuralist feminists
have since re-evaluated the latter manoeuvre
arguing that it is inadequate, not even
desirable, insofar as, paradoxically, it ends 
up reinforcing exactly these constructed
differences between ‘men’ and ‘women’,
‘culture’ and ‘nature’, which they refuse on
the basis of their sexualising, racialising and
universalising effects (see Butler, 1993; Alcoff
in Tong and Tuana, 1995; Flax in Nicholson,
1990). Instead, they are more concerned with
problematising ‘nature’ by asserting the social
and cultural constructedness of the category
‘women’. According to post-structural
feminists, it is only by acknowledging the
constructedness of ‘nature’, consequently of
‘women’ (and ‘men’), that ‘spaces for more
plural forms of self-identification’ can be
created (in Kemp and Squires, 1997: 469). 
To the extent that social constructionism
problematises ‘nature’ as given, it offers
feminists ways of criticising dominant
conceptions of being as based on false
foundational claims about the nature of both
‘women’ and ‘men’. Contrary to the idea 
of ‘nature’ as given social constructionism3
suggests that ‘nature’ is a contingent social 
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1 To oppose the idea that women are naturally inferior to men, in 1976 Simon de Beauvoir asserts ‘one is not born, but rather
becomes, a woman’ (de Beauvoir, 1988: 295).
2 Although, de Beauvoir’s implicit but also, at times, explicit rejection of ‘the body’ is seen by most feminists as problematic
insofar as it accepts and thus reinforces a split – an impossible split – between the mind and the body, which ultimately may
prove counter-productive for ‘women’ (in Price and Shildrick, 1999: 4; but see also Butler, 1993: 4).
3 Social constructionism is not easily definable. It encompasses an array of theoretical positions (from symbolic intereactionism
to postmodernism), whose aims and objectives are very complex and different (see, for instance, Berger & Luckmann, 1966,
Goffman, 1954, Foucault, 1979; Derrida, 1974 among many others). However, the one thing that associates them is that
they all share a common ‘epistemological scepticism’ about the nature of ‘facts’. And it is this ‘epistemological scepticism’
against meta-narratives of ‘reason’, ‘progress’ and ‘truth’ which has proved very valuable for feminists.
deemed a specifically male hormone and
estrogen a specifically female one, with the
advance in organic chemistry and the
development of experimental techniques,
scientists began to conceptualize hormones
differently. Hormones began to be
conceptualized as ‘catalysts: chemical
substances, sexually unspecific in origin and
function, exerting manifold activities, instead
of being primarily sex agents’ (Oudshoorn,
1994: 36). At this point, investigation into sex
hormones became more sophisticated and
not only were androgens and estrogens
found together (e.g. the presence of ‘female’
hormones was found in the urine of stallions)
but it also became apparent that they were
close chemical cousins and that testosterone
could be converted to estrogen (Oudshoorn,
1994). However, Oudshoorn argues that
‘although scientists abandoned the concept
of sexual specificity, the terminology was not
adjusted to this change in conceptualization
[…] the names male and female sex
hormones have been kept in current use,
both inside and outside the scientific
community’ (Oudshoorn, 1994: 12, 36). This,
she says, demonstrates how scientific
knowledge is bound by what she calls a
‘disciplinary style’ (a term which she takes
from Foucault, 1999) that constructs
phenomena as ‘natural’ in order to legitimate
its premises and findings even when they are
contradictory and ‘messy’ (see also Fausto-
Sterling in Harrison and Hood-Williams, 2002:
125). In other words, according to this view,
‘the matter’ that is presumed and awaiting
the work of science is in reality constructed
(materialized) by science itself (see also Barad
in Rosengarten, [n. d.]: 5, 7)
Moreover, in opposition to the idea that the
biological body exists independently of
representations of it, Judith Butler develops
Foucauldian insights further to create a
sophisticated theory of the body’s materiality
as performatively constituted by the
regulatory norms of ‘sex’ (Butler in Harrison
and Hood-Williams, 2002). More specifically,
against Freud’s notion of identification as the
resolution of the Oedipal complex, she writes: 
‘Because the solution of the Oedipal
dilemma can be either positive or
negative, the prohibition of the opposite-
sexed other can either lead to an
identification with the sex of the parent
lost or a refusal of identification…’
(Butler, 1990: 134).
In other words, ‘the refusal of identification’
is also part of the process of ‘materialization’
through which identities develop.
Consequently, Butler suggests that although
identification enables certain sexed subjects
to emerge, ‘in the demand that identification
be reiterated persists the possibility, the
threat, that it will fail to repeat’ (Butler, 1993:
102). Thus, she contends, the process of
‘materialization’ through which both ‘men’
and ‘women’ develop their identities is not
completely successful and cannot be
regarded as universal (Butler, 1993: 2).
Specifically, it is through the refusal of
identification (or ‘disidentification’) that what
she calls ‘abject others’ develop; ‘bodies’ who
do not seem to count but who are
nonetheless necessary to the creation of the
heterosexual subject (Butler, 1993: 3-4). As
Grosz says, for Butler identity is performed or
produced through action and not simply, as
psychoanalysis suggests, through
identification (see Butler in Grosz, not dated).
This is why Butler argues that it is not
possible to talk about ‘matter’ and/or ‘sex’ as
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and cultural construct that should not be
taken for granted. This is not to say that
feminists accept social constructionism
uncritically; yet, increasingly they make use of
it not just to explain ‘women’ but also the
oppression of other ‘bodies that matter’ (see,
for example, Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994;
Spivak, 1988). 
Nevertheless, as this paper will show, despite
these important contributions to the question
of ‘nature’ and of the individual as socially
and culturally constructed, this approach
raises a difficult question: how is it possible
to talk about ‘nature’ without re-inscribing it
into ‘culture’ precisely under the guise of
their radical separation or difference (see
Kirby, 1997; Wilson, 1998; Irigaray, 1985;
Weed and Schor, 1994; but also and again
Butler, 1993; Grosz, 1994; Spivak, 1988)?
As Michelle Barrett notes, ‘[i]n the past ten
years we have seen an extensive ‘turn to
culture’ in feminism (Barret in Kemp &
Squires, 1997: 112). The ‘turn to culture’ has
meant that increasingly feminists have moved
away from conceptualisations of ‘women’ as
a unified ‘natural’ category and come to
perceive it as a differentiated social construct.
Particularly by bringing the question of
‘difference’ to the forefront, ‘second wave’
feminists have shown that ‘women’s situation
of oppression is not reducible to women’s
‘biology’ or ‘nature’ (see, for example, de
Beauvoir, 1989; Firestone, 1970; Rich, 1979;
Irigaray, 1985; Cixous, 1987) because as for
‘other oppressed bodies’ (see Butler, 1993)
‘women’s oppression is related to questions
of ‘culture’, ‘knowledge’, ‘language’ and
‘power’ (see, for example, Harding, 1991;
Pateman, 1989; hooks, 1992; Spivak, 1988;
Haraway, 1990; Grosz, 1994; Braidotti,
1994). This, however, is not to suggest that
feminists have lost sight of questions of
‘nature’; on the contrary. Nevertheless, it is
through ‘culture’ that ‘nature’ and what are
presumed ‘natural’ phenomena, such as the
body, sex, reproduction, biology and
hormones, to cite only a few examples, are
increasingly being explained within feminism. 
In her book Beyond the Natural Body: An
Archeology of Sex Hormones, for instance,
Nelly Oudshoorn looks at scientific
knowledge and, in line with Thomas
Laqueur4, she suggests that scientists are
actively constructing rather than discovering
reality and that ‘the naturalistic reality of the
body as such does not exist’ (Oudshoorn in
Harrison and Hood-Williams, 2002: 133). 
Her contribution to the question of ‘nature’
consists in challenging the idea that there is
such a thing as a ‘natural body’ by showing
how scientific knowledge constructs rather
than explains the ‘natural’ facts that it is
presumed to discover. Specifically, drawing 
on Foucault, she describes the archeology 
of sex hormones in terms of a process of
sexualisation in which sex hormones are
created as ‘material products’ to ‘transform
and sexualize the world we live in’
(Oudshoorn in Harrison and Hood-Williams,
2002: 127). Thus, for example, she explains
that while early research on ‘sex hormones’
was firmly focussed on the gonads (or
reproductive sex glands) and androgen was
4 The Question of ‘Nature’: What has Social Constructionism to offer Feminist Theory?
4 In his book Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud, Laqueor (1990) develops a powerful argument about
scientific explanation of the body as socially contingent with the aim to unsettling biologistic arguments about the
differences between women and men. In her book Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones, Oudshoorn
also questions scientific knowledge and the naturalistic view of the body that it produces. 
domination, but also to open them up to
new possibilities for ‘resignification’ (Butler,
1993: 30). For her, in fact, it is not enough to
challenge the radical exclusion of ‘women’
from hegemonic cultural formations as if the
category ‘woman’ was a ‘natural’ and
universal one. Rather the category itself and
the normative conditions that produce it,
including ‘race’ and ‘class’ as well as ‘sex’,
need to be displaced if feminists want to
deprive ‘hegemonic culture and its critics of
the claim to essentialist accounts of gender
identity’ (Butler in Nicholson, 1990: 325,
338). As she says, ‘“[s]ex” is always produced
as a reiteration of hegemonic norms’ (Butler,
1993: 107); thus, only by questioning the
naturalness of sex itself, can feminists move
towards understanding how certain bodies
come to matter, while ‘initiating new
possibilities, new ways for bodies to matter’
(Butler, 1993: 30). 
However, as this paper will demonstrate,
although Butler’s theory illuminates the
problems of elaborating a ‘universal
philosophy’ based on a fixed and immutable
conception of the individual, it is not without
difficulties. Following Butler’s question, ‘[f]or
whom is outness a historically available and
affordable option?’ (Butler, 1993: 227, italics
added), for instance, it may seem plausible to
ask: what about those ‘bodies’ that do not
resist ‘identification’ and are inexorably
constrained within specific, ‘material’,
‘sexual’, ‘racial’ and ‘class’ boundaries?
Moreover, what about those bodies that do
not have the ‘cultural’ and ‘economic’ capital
to engage in the politics of representation?5
According to Kirby, ‘acknowledging that
identity is always problematic does not mean
that we can remove ourselves from the
politics of identifying practices’ (Kirby, 1997:
172). If on the one hand, the idea of the
natural as given is very difficult (impossible) to
sustain, on the other, as Kirby suggests, the
implicit attempt of Butler’s theory to explain
‘matter’ or ‘nature’ through ‘discourse’, is
also problematic insofar as it risks privileging
‘the ideational’ over ‘the material’, ‘the
cultural’ over ‘the natural’ and, thus,
reinstalling just these ‘identities and
sexualized hierarchies between ideality and
matter, culture and nature, and mind and
body’, which it was one of her main aims to
displace (Kirby, 1997: 107). According to
Kirby, this is because Butler’s theory is limited
to a linguistic or discursive account which
fails to tackle ‘the in-itself of matter’, ‘the
materiality of matter’ (Kirby, 1997: 108). In
Butler’s account ‘matter’ is accounted for as
that which exceeds representation; thus, in
Kirby’s words, it is rendered unspeakable and
unthinkable by the same tokens that qualified
it as ‘that which matters’ (Kirby, 1997: 108).
Consequently, Kirby challenges Butler’s
assertion that ‘to return to matter requires
that we return to matter as a sign’ (see
Butler, 1993: 49) ‘by putting the sign itself
into question’6 and by exploring identity at
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if they were a priori essential categories from
which ‘bodies’ develop because they are part
of these disciplinary processes and, thus,
deeply implicated in them. These categories,
she states, are not naturally given phenomena,
whose reality can be somehow separated from
the cultural strictures of ‘gender performance’
but regulatory constructs/norms, whose
‘materiality’ can only ‘be re-thought as an
effect of power’ (Butler in Harrison and Hood-
Williams, 2002: 192). ‘Sexual difference’, says
Butler, ‘is never simply a function of material
difference’ because ‘sex is an ideal construct
which is forcibly materialized’ (Butler, 1993: 1).
Put differently, for Butler, ‘sex’ works to
materialize one’s body’s sex and it does so
following a ‘heterosexual imperative’, which,
as she shows, is in no way ‘absolute’. Thus,
Butler argues, what individuals signify is not
ontologically given and/or ‘natural’ and ‘to
return to matter to ground claims about sexual
difference’ is problematic because ‘matter is
not prior to discourse’ but ‘is fully sedimented
with discourses on sex and sexuality’ (Butler in
Burke, Schor and Whitford, 1994: 143). She
claims, ‘there is no reference to a pure body
which is not at the same time a further
formation of that body’ (Butler, 1993: 10);
consequently, the question is not whether to
re-claim and/or rescue ‘materiality’ from the
grip of patriarchalism but:
‘…why “materiality” has become a sign
of irreducibility, that is, how is it that the
materiality of sex is understood as that
which only bears cultural constructions
and, therefore, cannot be a construction?
[…] And what kinds of constructions are
foreclosed through the figuring of this
site as outside or beneath construction
itself?’ (Butler, 1993: 28).
Her intention is not to deny the existence of
‘matter’ [and she, in fact, acknowledges the
possibility of an array of “immaterialities”
that pertain to the body (see Butler, 1993:
66)] but to analyse and problematise the
‘process of materialization that stabilizes over
time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity
and surface we call “matter”’ (Butler, 1993:
9). According to Butler, ‘only if matter can 
be rescued from its location as both prior 
and passive with regard to the notion of
production’, for feminists it will be possible 
to displace ‘the hierarchical economy of the
nature/culture opposition and the sexualizing
and racialising agenda that it informs’
(quoted in Kirby, 1997: 101). She is aware
that this is not an easy task because to
dislodge ‘matter’ itself is not just to render
any foundational conceptions of being
obsolete but also to displace any notions of
‘femininity’ as essentialising. However, she
regards this manoeuvre as indispensable to
the destabilisation of hegemonic oppressive
norms and practices (Butler, 1993: 30-32).
She states: 
‘To call a presupposition [materiality] into
question is not the same as doing away
with it; rather, it is to free it from its
metaphysical lodgings in order to
understand what political interests were
secured in and by that metaphysical
placing, and thereby to permit the term
to occupy and to serve very different
political aims’ (Butler, 1993: 30).
In other words, according to Butler, it is only
by freeing ‘materiality’ from its metaphysical
lodgings that it becomes possible not only to
contest/deconstruct ‘natural/biological’ taken
for granted sexual categories, which
reproduce and reinforce existing relations of
6 The Question of ‘Nature’: What has Social Constructionism to offer Feminist Theory?
5 Although this essay is not concerned with exploring the limits of a politics centered on re-signifying practices in relation to
‘material economic inequalities’, the question seems mandatory.  For an analysis of these limits see, for instance, Fraser,
1998/2000; Hennessey, 1993/1999; O’Sullivan, 1994; Benhabib, 1995; Klein, 2000. 
6 Kirby puts the sign into question by exploring Saussure’s idea that the sign is arbitrary. Particularly, she says that, although
Saussure tries dispensing with the referent through the notion of arbitrariness (Saussure, 1974: 67), the ambiguities in his
texts show that the referent is not so easily dispensable. According to Kirby, Saussure's concept of language as a differential
system without positive terms implies that the concept of arbitrariness cannot simply be located between two separate
terms; it is also within each term. Hence, for Kirby, the body is as mutable and articulate as culture (Kirby in Mutman, 1999).
Thus, following Irigaray, Stone suggests that
feminists can not proceed in their claims as if
there were no differences between ‘the
sexes’ because in reality ‘men’ and ‘women’
are different and only represented as ‘the
same’ to accommodate a phallocentric
discourse9 (Stone, 2004). Furthermore, as
Grosz explains:
‘If women cannot be characterized in any
general way, if all there is to femininity is
socially produced, how can feminism be
taken seriously? What justifies the
assumption that women are oppressed 
as a sex?’ (Grosz, 1998)
An argument being made here for feminists
not to refuse all forms of ‘essentialism’
because this could simply mean the end of
feminist politics itself (which would then only
appear as another form of negative
essentialism) (in Schor and Weed, 1994: xiii).
Consequently, as previously noted (see
paragraph above on Kirby), attempts have
been made not only to try to re-conceptualize
‘essentialism’ (see again Stone, 2004; Fuss,
1989; Schor and Weed, 1994; but also
Spivak’s notion of ‘strategic essentialism’,
1984/5: 184) but also to find productive
(although in no way ‘absolute’) points of
connections between social constructionism
on the one hand, and biology and scientific 
studies/theories, on the other (see Wilson,
1997/8, Rosengarten, 2004)10.
More specifically, Elisabeth Wilson challenges
the idea that the study of sexuality needs to
be separated from the neurosciences (as in
certain forms of social constructionism)
because this separation risks leaving
questions of scientific authority unchallenged,
failing to acknowledge the ‘phallocentric
economy’ reproduced within it (Wilson,
1998). According to Wilson, if on the one
hand, ‘scientific’ claims such as that of Simon
le Vay ‘that homosexual and heterosexual
identities have a neurobiological substrate’
constitute neurocognitive matter as ‘self-
present and originary’ (Wilson, 1998: 202-3),
on the other, conceptualisations of the body
in purely constructionist terms effect a
‘displacement of biological presence’, which
is ultimately counter-productive for feminism
(Wilson, 1998: 203). For her, therefore,
feminists should not do away with questions
of scientific authority but they should deal
with them, ‘not simply at those sites where 
it takes women as objects, but also in the
neutral zones, in those places where
feminism appears to have no place and no
political purchase’ (Wilson, 1998: 18-19). 
For Wilson, this means engaging with the
domain of ‘the biological’ itself as a site of
complexity and eccentricity (see Wilson’s re-
The Question of ‘Nature’: What has Social Constructionism to offer Feminist Theory? 9
‘the atomic level of its constitution’ (Kirby,
1997: 128). According to Kirby, the paradox
of the sign’s identity (that it is dependent
upon ‘différance’; see Derrida, 1974) is
symptomatic of the paradox of identity
generally. And the process of différance
outlined by Derrida afflicts everything,
including the body (Kirby, 1997: 53-56).
Therefore she suggests that feminists cannot
dismiss discourse on ‘sociobiology, cognitive
studies, and artificial intelligence’ on the basis
that they are essentialising and ‘politically
offensive’ (see Spivak in Kirby, 1997: 160)
because ‘the body as the scene of writing’ (an
image which again she takes from Derrida,
1974) is ‘an inscribing of all essentialisms,
even of the politically offensive’ (Kirby, 1997:
160). Oppression, according to Kirby, may
actually craft and shape the materiality of the
body through, for example, starvation,
torture, long hours of low paid and exploited
labour (see Kirby but also Cheah Pheng7 in
Threadgold, 2003). Consequently, although
Kirby would agree with Butler that the body is
not ‘natural’ and/or ‘essential’ ‘as opposed to
culturally inscribed’, she refuses to see
‘essentialism’ as intrinsically untenable.
Instead, she sees essentialism not merely as
prohibitive but also as enabling on the basis
that the body is ‘“natural” and/or “essential”
because indistinguishable from “culture”’
(Kirby in Deutscher, 1997, italics added).
According to Kirby, in fact, ‘nature’ is not
outside culture but it is an active ‘telling
substance’, whose materiality needs to be
acknowledged and ‘heard’ (Kirby: 1997: 127).
And she suggests that the way to confront
the nature/language opposition is not simply
to problematise ‘nature as that which always
bears the traces of discourse’, but to
conceptualise nature as ‘articulate’ (Kirby
1997: 72, 90). She, therefore, employs
Derrida’s insights that ‘there is no outside of
text’ (Derrida, 1984: 158) in an original way
to argue that ‘nature’ is not just a scene of
cultural inscription, it ‘both writes and is
written’ (Kirby, 1997: 61). In other words, if it
is the case that objects are influenced by
culture so, for Kirby, is ‘culture’ influenced by
‘materiality’ (Kirby, 1997: 56). Although
Kirby’s account of ‘matter’ as ‘the scene of
writing’ is not immune to criticism8, it raises
important questions about the politics of
‘representation’ and its relation to ‘the
biological facts of the body’s existence’ 
(Kirby, 1997: 70).
According to feminists, such as Stone,
moreover, the question of ‘nature’ cannot be
fully grasped from a constructionist approach
because this ignores how women’s ‘lived
corporeal existence’ is in fact devalued (see
Stone, 2004: 13; but also see Schor and
Weed, 1994; Grosz, 1998; Wilson, 1997/8).
From Stone’s perspective:
‘Precisely because the way we inhabit our
bodies is always culturally mediated, the
cultural devaluation of femininity and
feminized corporality adversely affects
women’s actual inhabitation of their
bodies and their power for practical
engagements with the world’ (Stone,
2004: 13).
8 The Question of ‘Nature’: What has Social Constructionism to offer Feminist Theory?
7 Particularly, Cheah Pheng questions the practice of ‘re-signification’ asking whether it constitutes an adequate model of
agency in a ‘neo-colonialist space’ where the very matter of the body ‘bears the instituted traces of the spacing and timing
of imperialism’ (Pheng Cheah in Threadgold, 2003).
8 Although Kirby poses some important questions regarding form, matter and their ‘accepted’ separability, it is unclear
whether her own approach successfully answers such questions. In particular, her strong reliance on deconstruction seems to
circumscribe her own theoretical approach to certain type of resources, while foreclosing other possibilities which possibly
could have enhanced her understanding of the nature/mind dichotomy (Reynolds, 2000).
9 Although, not every feminist would necessarily agree with Stone’s suggestion that every type of ‘political essentialism’ is
inherently unstable and, thus, that there is a need for a return to ontology or ‘realist essentialism’ (Stone, 2004).
10 In fact, it seems fair to point out that it would be mistaken to think about Butler’s theory as ‘absolutely’ opposed to that of
theorists such as Kirby or Wilson (see Kirby above and paragraphs on Wilson below). Many points of connections can be
found between these theorists. In ‘Bodies that Matter’ Butler explicitly rejects the idea that ‘sexuality’ can be made or
unmade at will (Butler, 1993: 94). Her performative understanding of discursive practices can be seen as an attempt to
challenge the ‘unexamined habits of mind that grant language and other forms of power in determining our ontologies’ (in
Barad, 2003). Moreover, both Wilson and Kirby acknowledge and make use of certain social constructionism insights to
develop their theories. However, by making their differences explicit, this essay hopes showing the limits of post-structural
approaches in their engagement with ‘the biological’, while opening possibilities for ‘different’ understandings of ‘nature’,
‘the natural’ and consequently of ‘sexual difference’ than that conceived within strictly constructivist terms; although it
acknowledges that there is no ‘original outside’ to which ‘we’ can return.
machine that thinks (Wilson, 1996, 1998:
109). However, as Wilson shows, Turing’s
model of ‘cognition’ is clearly achieved
through a complete annihilation and
denigration of ‘the body’. As an example, she
points out that ‘[t]he Turing test is conducted
via written or couriered information between
the players: there is no bodily, visual or aural
contact between the participants’ as if the
body was an unimportant and unnecessary
obstacle to the end result of the test (Wilson,
1996, 1998: 109). It is as if for Turing, in
complete accordance to Descartes’ maxim,
‘Cogito ergo sum’ (see Descartes,
1642/1971), ‘to think’ requires the complete
disavowing of the body. However, Wilson
asks, what are the hidden desires that inform
this economy of thought? Is knowledge
‘neutral’ as Turing would have us believe? Or
is the neutrality of knowledge achieved at the
expense of ‘the body’ and/or of ‘nature’?
Clearly, for Wilson, knowledge is not neutral.
Instead, for her, ‘cognition as neutral or
dispassionate computation’ is a myth
produced ‘according to the demands of a
male imaginary and morphology’, which
respects only ‘containment, fixity and
certitude’ (Wilson, 1996). She says, ‘cognition
is the projection of the masculine desire to be
free of the body’; ‘it is simply a reinstantiation
of the Cartesian desire for the kernel of man
to be pure intellectuality’ (Wilson, 1996).
Thus, taking up but also radically expanding
Irigaray’s challenge about the impossibility of
separating ‘the body’ from ‘the mind’ on the
basis that this separation ‘enables the
reproduction of the phallocentric privileging
of male representations of subjectivity’ (and,
consequently, of ‘femininity’) (Irigaray quoted
in Pateman and Grosz, 1986: 136), Wilson
proposes a ‘connectionist model’, in which
individual units function internally to
propagate and transform activity in the
network and, as such, have no
representational status. Within this model,
rules are not stored in a central nervous
system but are implicit in the structure of the
network. Knowledge is distributed rather
than local, and not locatable, either
cognitively or anatomically (in Hollway, 2000).
According to Wilson, connectionism offers
modalities for breaching the separation
between ‘the mind’ and ‘the body’ because 
it shows that the brain’s functions and
consciousness are far more complex than 
can be explained by reductive notions of
biological determinism and genetic
programming. It shows that ‘cognitive
patterns are established differently in the
course of individual histories’ (Scott, 2001). It
is via connectionism that, ‘the embodiment
of the psyche is enacted not through present
cortical traces, but through the deferral and
difference of a material trace that is nowhere
locatable’ (Wilson, 1998: 162). Her goal,
however, is not to substitute Turing’s notion
of cognition with a purely ‘feminine’ one
because, according to Wilson, ‘there is no
natural or pre-discursive psychical fluidity to
which our formulations could return’. Rather,
she wants ‘to disrupt the containment and
certainty of this (supposed) neutral cognition’
(Wilson, 1996) in order to produce
knowledge of the body as interacting with
and also exceeding the possibilities of the
physical parameters within which it operates
(Wilson, 1998). Ultimately, for Wilson, the
aim of feminism is to develop a theory of
‘mind and body’ that takes into account
developments within the natural sciences
rather than disregarding them a priori
(Wilson, 1998). In her view: 
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evaluation of Freud’s analysis of male
hysteria, 2004). It means complicating ‘an
easy division between the political and the
material stasis of “this neurological body”
and the political and material malleability of
“the cultural body”’ (Wilson, 1998: 203). 
In the introduction to her latest book,
Psychosomatic: Feminism and the neurological
body, for example, Wilson looks at the
hysterical body to argue that, although Freud’s
idea of ‘conversion hysteria’ has proved very
productive for feminism, it has come at the
expenses of the ‘bio-logic’ (Wilson, 2004: 4).
In particular, she says that ‘the preference for
analyses of ideational contortion at the
expenses of biological conversion suggests
that the question of the body has yet to be
posed as comprehensively as it could be’
(Wilson, 2004: 5). Consequently, ‘the
particularities of the muscles, nerves and
organs in their hysterical state have remained
under-examined’ within feminist theorizing
(Wilson, 2004: 4). This is why she suggests
that ‘rather than disregarding Freud at those
moments where he invokes biology, we may
be better served by a consideration of the
data he lays before us’ (Wilson, 2004: 12).
Even though she recognizes that the
biological is not a neutral domain, she
believes that perhaps feminists have dismissed
it too quickly (Wilson, 2004). Thus, for
instance, she points out that ‘hysterics do
indeed suffer from reminiscences’ as firstly
exposed by Freud and Breuer, but that
symptoms, such as blindness, physical pain
and incessant cough, which deeply affect the
body, are also caused by hysteria and cannot
be simply disregarded (Wilson, 2004: 5). For
her, feminists ‘can be deeply and happily
complicit with biological explanation’ and
‘more affectionately involved with
neurobiological data’ without necessarily
accepting the dominant conceptualization of
nature/matter as biologically determined
(Wilson, 2004: 13, 14). She says, ‘[t]his
preference for neurological analysis’ does not
want to diminish other feminist cultural,
social, linguistic, literary and historical analyses
but open possibilities that do not foreclose
those aspects of ‘biology’, which could
enhance rather than underplay feminist
understandings of the body (Wilson, 2004: 8).
Particularly, according to Wilson, feminists
need research about ‘the nature of cognition
itself’ because it is there that the
‘disembodied nature of “thinking” itself’
appears more clearly (Wilson, 1996; 1998:
19). In other words, it is there that ‘nature’
and/or ‘the corporeal’ loses all its ‘power’ and
becomes completely disavowed. Thus, in
‘“Loving the Computer Cognition”,
Embodiment and the Influencing Machine’,
she analyses Alan Turing's (1950) Test on
computing machinery and intelligence and,
by employing Irigaray’s notion of morphology,
she shows that his idea of cognition is
premised on ‘the expulsion of the corporeal’
and it is achieved at the expense of ‘the
body’. More specifically, for Wilson, Turing’s
notion of cognition is produced by ‘the
containment of the corporeal to the
feminine, and its subsequent displacement’
(Wilson, 1996). The Turing Test consists in
testing a number of men and women in
relation to ‘the thinking capacity’ of a
computer to see if the machine is really
capable of thinking. If the interrogator is
unable to distinguish the machine’s answers
from the answers of the man, then this
particular machine is said to have passed the
Turing Test. The machine whose answer is
indistinguishable from that of the man is the
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‘essential-sing’ ‘nature’, ‘the natural’ and ‘the
feminine’, feminists cannot fully explain the
limitations of the subject/object dichotomy
for other oppressed bodies but, paradoxically,
seem to rely on it for their claim of objectivity,
on the other, an emphasis on ‘culture’ risks
leaving ‘the naturalness’ of ‘the body’, its
morphology, ‘flesh’, desires and history,
unquestioned. Particularly, according to
authors such as Wilson, it is those aspects of
‘biology’ that are most ‘physical’ and/or
‘carnal’ which are often under-theorized
within contemporary feminist theorizing. To
emphasize ‘the biological’ and/or ‘the
natural’, however, is not a return to a pre-
feminist understanding of the naturalness of
‘sex’ (and ‘the body’) as opposed to ‘gender’
(and ‘culture’). Rather, it may be seen as an
effort toward ‘alternative’ conceptions of
‘matter’ that take into account, but also
interrogate, both developments within the
social and the natural sciences in the
awareness that to simply re-inscribe it into
the cultural ‘is the monist, or logocentric,
gesture par excellence’ (Grosz quoted in
Wilson, 1998: 66). Ultimately, in fact, ‘nature’
and/or ‘matter’ are not outside of culture nor
are they simply ‘cultural’, but they are sites of
considerable complexity, whose
understanding is neither self-evident nor
uncomplicated and should be ‘included’ in
the problematic of identity.
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‘Critiques premised on a primary
oppositional relation to the sciences or
premised on anti-biologism, anti-
essentialism, or anti-utilitarism are losing
their critical and political purpose – not
necessarily because they are wholly
mistaken, but because they have relied
on, and reauthorized, a separation
between the inside and the outside, the
static and the changeable, the natural
and the political, the chromosomal and
the cultural’ (Wilson, 1998: 200).
Hence, paradoxically, feminists accepting
these premises risk naturalizing ‘material
processes’, which they should instead be
exploring (Rosengarten, 2004). As an
alternative, Wilson proposes a body that is
produced ‘by contingent impressions
(radically individualized) which mix sensory
responses and unconscious fantasies
(registered neurologically) in ways that make
nonsense both of genetic determinism and
mind/body separations’ (Wilson quoted in
Scott, 2001). Although, given restrictions of
space, a full assessment of her proposition is
not possible within this paper, without doubt
Wilson provides important theoretical insights
to the question of ‘nature’ from a different
perspective than that put forward within
strictly social constructionist terms. On the
one hand, she questions the idea that the
domain of politics is the public as opposed to
the private by strongly suggesting not only
that ‘the private is political’11 but that ‘the
natural’ is also political and worth
consideration (Hird, 2004; see also Butler in
Benhabib, 1995); while, on the other, she
puts into question the idea that identity is
simply socially and linguistically constructed
by proposing a theory of ‘the body’ as
indistinguishable from ‘the mind’. For Wilson,
in fact, the idea of the mind as separable
from the body is a ‘masculinist’ one; one that
presumes a certain kind of embodiment,
which ‘fits with certain masculinist
presumptions about psychological
functioning’ (Wilson, 1996).
In conclusion, social constructionism offers
feminists means to challenge the idea that
women are inferior to men due to their
natural characteristics (an idea held by almost
every Western philosopher prior to feminism).
In particular, the idea that identities are
socially and linguistically constructed enables
a critique of dominant hegemonic
conceptions of ‘heterosexuality’, ‘sex’,
‘gender’ and ‘race’ as ‘natural’ and/or
‘essential’. Their ‘essentiality’ is displaced and
the cultural process of symbolisation through
which these concepts are naturalised is
problematized enabling a different
conception of identity as performed or
produced through action. According to this
view, we are not natural givens but produced
by signifying practices and ideologies,
discourses motivated or determined by
power, and our identities are contingent
politico-cultural and historical constructions.
However, despite these important theoretical
contributions to the question of identity,
what this paper demonstrates is that
attempting to re-construct ‘nature’ from the
point of view of discourse risks reinforcing
the nature/culture dichotomy which it was
one of the main aims of post-structuralist
theory to displace. If on the one hand, by
12 The Question of ‘Nature’: What has Social Constructionism to offer Feminist Theory?
11 The idea that the ‘personal and/or private is political’ was first elaborated by ‘second wave’ feminists during the 1960s and
70s and it enabled feminists to enter issues of political contestation, such as domestic violence, domestic labour, abortion to
name just a few, which were hitherto believed to lie outside of politics. 
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